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Focusing upon how a ‘national’ film has been historically defined in Britain, this article traces the 
history of legal definitions of a ‘British’ film and identifies some of the issues around nationality that 
these have raised. The article begins with a discussion of the introduction of quotas for ‘British’ films 
in the 1920s and the adoption of the Eady levy as a means of providing production finance to 
‘British’ films in the post-war period. It then goes on to examine the introduction, in response to EU 
regulations governing the film industry, of a ‘Cultural Test’ for ‘British film’ in 2007 and to consider 
the way in which eligibility for tax reliefs has depended upon a film qualifying as ‘British’.  In 
assessing whether the Cultural Test may be regarded as constituting a ‘break’ in British film policy in 
terms of a shift from economic to cultural objectives, the article not only indicates the manner in 
which cultural and economic objectives have been brought into alignment but also identifies how 
the definition of the ‘national’ for the purposes of tax relief has been designed to encourage 
‘transnational’ Hollywood production within the UK. In doing so, the article also indicates how 
‘national’ discourses and practices have continued to inform and structure the economic and 
cultural dynamics of contemporary ‘British’ cinema as well as engaging with, rather than necessarily 
standing in opposition to, ‘transnational’ and globalising trends. 
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Introduction 
The idea of the ‘national’ in film studies has been subject to considerable discussion in the 
last two decades (Crofts 1998, Vitali and Willemen 2006, Hjort 2010). This debate has arisen 
partly in response to the changing economic, political and cultural attributes of nations in an 
era of globalisation and partly in response to the various ways in which cinema – from 
funding, production and distribution to modes of cultural representation and address – has 
acquired an increasingly ‘transnational’ character. However, while these debates have 
encouraged the development of new frameworks for the conceptualisation and analysis of 
varying groups of films, they have also tended to under-estimate the persistence of the 
‘national’ in the face of globalisation and transnational flows. This has partly been a matter 
of conceptualisation whereby critical accounts of ‘national cinema’ have defined it in such a 
restrictive and one-dimensional way that the term has inevitably been stripped of any 
potential use-value as an analytical tool. However, in many cases, it has also involved an 
element of downplaying, or even ignoring, certain kinds of empirical evidence. For, despite 
the pronouncement of the death of the ‘national’ by a number of writers, discourses of the 
‘national’ do, nevertheless, continue to structure and inform how films of various kinds are 
categorised, funded, promoted and made sense of by a range of social actors ranging from 
politicians and civil servants to filmmakers, critics and audiences.  
The survival of discourses of the national might be said to be particularly evident in  
film policy which has continued to fall within the ambit of national governments (if not 
exclusively so) and to be based upon objectives that are often conceived of in ‘national’ 
terms. Definitions of nationality, for example, have always been central to the 
implementation of film quotas. Indeed, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, that 
first came into force in 1948, explicitly exempted ‘films of national origin’ from the general 
principles of free trade to which the agreement was otherwise devoted (GATT 1986). 
Although quotas no longer enjoy the popularity that they once did, the expansion of the 
range of policy instruments employed in support of the production of films – such as loans, 
grants and tax incentives -  has nonetheless ensured that the classification of films as in 
some way ‘national’ has remained an important political and legal matter. In their discussion 
of ‘the nationality of culture’, for example, Grant and Wood consider a range of definitions 
adopted by the governments of various countries, including Australia, Canada, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway and South Africa, that have been employed to determine the 
‘national’ status of film and television output within their territories (2004, pp. 153-64).  
Although efforts such as these may appear to be at odds with the ways in which so much 
film financing and production traverses national boundaries, they do, nonetheless, play an 
important role not only in framing how the nationality of a film is initially defined and 
understood but also in influencing how film projects are put together and funded in the first 
place. It is, therefore, this question of how a ‘national’ film has been historically defined in 
Britain that provides the focus of this paper.  
It will begin by charting the history of legal definitions of a ‘British’ film since the 
1920s and identifying some of the issues around nationality that these have raised.1 
Following a consideration of the introduction of quotas for ‘British’ films in the 1920s and the 
adoption of the Eady levy as a means of providing production finance to ‘British’ films in the post-
war period, the article goes on to examine the introduction of a ‘Cultural Test’ for ‘British film’ in 
2007  (in response to EU regulations governing the film industry) and to consider how eligibility for 
tax reliefs has depended upon the qualification of films as ‘British’.  In assessing whether the Cultural 
Test may be regarded as constituting a ‘break’ in British film policy in terms of a shift from economic 
to cultural objectives, the article not only indicates the manner in which cultural and economic 
objectives have been brought into alignment but also identifies how the definition of the ‘national’ 
for the purposes of tax relief has been designed to encourage ‘transnational’ Hollywood production 
within the UK. Thus, while the UK’s film policies might be regarded as providing an example 
of what Diane Crane refers to as ‘national… cultural policies’ offering ‘a form of resistance to 
American dominance’, they turn out not only to be less ‘cultural’ than they initially appear 
but also to have been designed in such a way as to encourage, as much as resist, 
Hollywood’s involvement in ‘local’ production (Crane 2014, p. 379). Although this has 
become much more evident in recent years, a degree of meshing of the economic and the 
cultural, and the national and the international, may be seen to have been a feature of the 
relevant legislation since quotas for British films were introduced  in the 1920s.  
Defining a ‘British’ Film 
The task of defining a ‘British’ film for legal purposes arose in the 1920s as a result of the 
introduction of a quota for British films in response to the domination of British cinema 
screens by films made in Hollywood (Hartog 1983). Under the 1927 Cinematograph Films 
Act, a film, in order to qualify as ‘British’, had to meet a number of requirements relating to 
the nationality of those making it, the use of studios (within Britain and the British Empire 
more generally) and the payment of salaries and wages. The original Cinematograph Films 
Bill had indicated that, in order to be deemed a ‘British film’, a film must be made by ‘a 
person who was a British subject… or by a British controlled company’ (p. 14).2 This was in 
line with the earlier Report of the Joint Trade Committee that had also argued for a quota 
that would increase the number of British films, encourage employment of British labour 
and ‘establish an industry under British control’ (quoted in PEP 1952, p. 43.)  During the 
Bill’s passage through the House of Commons, however, the wording was changed from 
‘British controlled company’ simply to ‘British company’ which, as a report in the Times 
indicated, meant ‘no more than a company with British registration (15 November 1927, p. 
17). Although the original definition of a ‘British controlled’ company had itself been 
conceived quite narrowly in terms of ‘voting power’, the change in terminology was 
perceived by critics to constitute a ‘loophole’ that left the door open for ‘non-British 
interests’ - in effect US companies - to establish, or acquire control of, British-registered 
companies involved in the making of ‘British’ films. There were also complaints that the 
requirement for expenditure on British labour excluded the salary or payments to one 
foreign actor or producer.  This, it was claimed, not only made it possible for Hollywood 
stars to appear in quota films with a ‘non-British bias’ but would also significantly reduce the 
amounts required to be paid to British personnel (Sandon, p. 10). 
Although the quota legislation led to an increase in British film production and 
encouraged vertical integration within the industry, it was also regarded as leading to the 
growth of American interests. As PEP (1952, p. 51) indicates, American companies were not 
only encouraged to undertake the production of films in the UK but also to strengthen their 
position within distribution and make moves into exhibition given the UK’s importance as an 
overseas market. This outcome has commonly been understood to be a failure of the quota 
policy to strengthen the domestic industry in the manner envisaged, particularly as a result 
of rise of the low-budget ‘quota quickie’ and the lack of attention to Hollywood’s role within 
distribution which continued to be the key to its dominance of the UK market. Betts (1973), 
for example, suggests that what occurred was ‘the reverse’ of what had been intended with 
the British film industry coming ‘more and more under American dominion’ and losing its 
‘independence’ (p.83). However, as the initial loosening of the definition of a ‘British film’ 
indicates, it is not at all clear that the legislation was straightforwardly designed to protect a 
British film industry independent of Hollywood involvement. Indeed, in his revisiting of the 
quota legislation and the debates surrounding the ‘quality’ of the ‘quota quickie’, Glancy 
(1998) argues that US involvement in British film production was hardly an ‘unforeseen 
development’ but the result of a deliberately chosen policy by ‘a government that did not 
want to grant state support to its own film industry, but sought some means of ensuring 
that the industry received funding’ (p. 60). In this respect, it may be argued that, from the 
very beginning, the definition of a ‘national’ film was constructed in a way that would allow 
‘transnational’ involvement and investment. This would seem to be confirmed by the 
revisions to the 1927 legislation contained in the 1938 Cinematograph Films Act. In response 
to concerns about the ‘quota quickie’, the new Act fixed a minimum labour cost and 
introduced double and triple quota provision for more expensive films. As Glancy observes, 
these measures helped to concentrate investment in fewer, more expensive films but also 
‘ensured that British films would be controlled increasingly by American companies’ (p. 65).  
The Janus-faced character of British film policy - of looking both inwards and 
outwards for financial investment – may also be seen to have been a feature of one of the 
planks of post-war film policy, the Eady levy. This was originally devised by the Treasury 
official Sir Wilfred Eady and was introduced on a voluntary basis in 1950 before being made 
compulsory under the Cinematograph Films Act of 1957.  Designed to return a proportion of 
box-office takings back to production, it consisted of a levy upon exhibitors' earnings that 
contributed to the British Film Production Fund administered by the British Film Fund 
Agency.  However, the definition of a British film remained substantially the same as in the 
1930s and, if anything, became a little looser by virtue of the growth of location, rather than 
studio, filming. Given the rise of mobile production, the size of the British market and the 
relative generosity of the funds provided through the Eady levy, Britain was destined to 
prove a favoured location for Hollywood filmmaking during the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, 
according to the National Film Finance Corporation (1968), the percentage of British quota 
films wholly or partly financed by Hollywood had risen to 72 per cent by 1967 (and to 90 per 
cent in terms of the actual volume of finance) (pp. 3-4). As early as 1956, John Davis, the 
Managing Director of the Rank Organisation and President of the British Film Producers 
Association, had argued that the Government had surely not intended that the levy should 
be used ‘to support films made in this country by American subsidiaries’ (quoted in Guback 
1969, p. 155). However, although the precise levels of support accruing to US subsidiaries 
may not have been entirely anticipated, there was also little appetite for bringing it to an 
end. Thus, despite its concern for ‘the extent of the dependence of British film production 
on US finance’, the NFFC believed that without US financial support there would scarcely be 
a British film industry at all and that, as a result, ‘nothing should be done to discourage the 
continuance of US investment’ (1967, p. 4). Indeed, in his discussion of the Eady levy (which 
he refers to as a ‘bribe’) in the early 1960s, Jonathan Stubbs indicates the lengths to which 
the Board of Trade were prepared to go in order to register a Hollywood film such as 
Lawrence of Arabia, shot largely outside of Britain, as a ‘British’ quota film (2009, pp. 8-13). 
The publication of the details of the distribution of the Eady levy from 1979 onwards also 
revealed the extent to which the biggest payments were made to commercially successful  
Hollywood productions – such as the Superman films – that may well have been shot in 
British studios but  were, nevertheless, scarcely recognisable as films that might be taken to 
be ‘culturally British’.  
In his discussion of post-war measures to support the film industries of Europe, 
Guback laments the way in which these policies were apparently hijacked by US interests: 
Production subsidies quite openly were instituted to aid domestic film makers in 
European countries at a time when capital was short and American pictures 
dominated the screens. Subsidization laws, to ensure that aid would go to those who 
needed it, incorporated definitions of “national” producer and “national” film. 
However, incredible as it seems, these laws did nothing to prevent foreign 
subsidiaries of American companies from conforming to the decrees so as to become 
“national” producers of “national” films (Guback 1976, p. 400). 
While Guback’s diagnosis of how Hollywood was able to take advantage of European 
incentives is certainly apt, his findings are not, perhaps, quite as ‘incredible’ as he suggests. 
In the case of the UK, there was clearly a willingness to maintain relatively elastic definitions 
of a ‘national’ film that would help to sustain a domestic film industry while simultaneously 
permitting, and even encouraging, US investment in a ‘domestic’ film industry that might be 
regarded as depending upon it.  This, as will be seen, continued to be the case even when 
definitions of a British film appeared to become less obviously based upon economic and 
industrial criteria and more overtly ‘cultural’ than they had been before.   
The ‘Cultural Test’ and tax policy 
In their account of the ways in which states categorise cultural products as ‘national’, Grant 
and Wood suggest how – under the 1985 Films Act (and the subsequent amendments to it 
passed by the Labour government in 1999) - the system for assessing the ‘Britishness’ of a 
film had been ‘almost entirely divorced from notions of culture’ (2004, p. 160). Although the 
1985 Films Act was, in a number of respects, a radical one, ending the Eady levy and closing 
the National Film Finance Corporation, its definition of a British film remained largely the 
same as those contained in previous Acts, stretching back to the 1920s.   As such, a British 
film continued to be defined in terms of the nationality of the film’s maker (be it a person or 
company), the location of the studio in which filming occurred and the amount of labour 
costs accruing to British or Commonwealth citizens.  The 1999 amendments placed a new 
emphasis upon production spend rather than the use of a studio but did not fundamentally 
alter the emphasis upon what might be regarded as economic factors. Indeed, the adoption 
of the criterion of production expenditure had previously been recommended by the 
Middleton Report on Film Finance which had explicitly called for the definition of a British 
film to be confined to ‘a straightforward economic test’ (Advisory Committee on Film 
Finance 1996, p. 5). It had made this recommendation on the basis of an argument that 
competition for production finance was increasingly global and that the UK government 
should therefore increase the tax incentives made available to the film industry as a means 
of attracting financial investment in British film production (ibid. p.31). Insofar as tax 
incentives did, from the 1990s onwards, become the preferred instrument of government 
film policy this meant that the definition of a ‘British’ film acquired a growing political 
significance as well.  
Following the election of the Conservatives, under Margaret Thatcher in 1979, both 
the quota for British film and the Eady levy were abolished in line with the new 
government’s more general policies of ‘rolling back the state’ and promoting market forces 
(Hill 1993). Following the production crisis that beset the industry at the end of the 1980s, 
however, there was considerable lobbying for government action, including a meeting with 
Thatcher at Downing Street in June 1990. This led to the establishment of a Tax Incentives 
Working Group, chaired by BFI Director Wilf Stevenson, which, in turn, helped to pave the 
way for the introduction of a tax relief (in the form of an accelerated write-off of production 
expenditure) under Section 42 of the 1992 Finance (No. 2) Act.  Following the election of a 
new Labour government in 1997, under Tony Blair, a further tax relief was introduced under 
Section 48 of the 1997 Finance Act (which further extended the reliefs available). Although 
film production had benefited from the use of capital allowances in the early 1980s, the 
provision of tax incentives constituted a relatively new policy instrument for the UK 
government.  This may be seen to be in line with the neo-liberal turn in economic policy 
inaugurated in the 1980s insofar as tax incentives for film production came to be regarded 
as a more ‘market-friendly’ alternative to quotas and levies. They were also understood to 
provide the most appropriate response to the increasing ‘globalisation’ of the international 
film industry and the growing mobility of Hollywood production in particular. In the face of 
increasing rivalry amongst states around the world to attract ‘runaway’ and globally 
dispersed productions, tax incentives were, therefore, held to be necessary in order to ‘level 
the playing field’ and enhance the attractiveness of the UK as a filming location (Perelli 
1991, Prescott 1991). In comparison with earlier forms of state film policy such as the Eady 
levy, this also meant that the rhetoric surrounding tax reliefs became much more explicit in 
acknowledging that a ‘national’ film policy in support of ‘British films’ was also, in effect, an 
‘international’ one geared mainly – if not exclusively - towards the encouragement of 
inward economic investment. Accordingly, the evaluation of the effectiveness of tax policy, 
and the enthusiasm of successive governments for continuing with it, have in large part 
rested upon its perceived success in attracting Hollywood productions to the UK. This is 
evident, for example, in the report of the Film Policy Review Panel, established by the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government in 2011 following the abolition of the 
UK Film Council, in which the chapter on ‘international’ film strategy simply welcomes tax 
reliefs for their capacity to attract ‘high budget films to the UK in the teeth of fierce 
competition’ (FPRP 2012, p. 77).  
However, while tax policy in support of ‘British’ film may be seen to have been 
driven by the economic goals of attracting inward investment and encouraging the 
production of films in the UK, it has also been underpinned by a ‘cultural’ rhetoric due to the 
introduction of a ‘Cultural Test’ for ‘British’ film in 2007 (Magor and Schlesinger 2009;  Hill 
2012). The Film Policy Review Group, established by the Labour government in 1997, had, in 
fact, recommended the introduction of a new points-based definition of a ‘culturally-British 
film’, that would take account of subject-matter, but this was not pursued when the 
definition of a British film was revised in 1999 (FPRG 1998, p. 54). However, as a result of an 
obligation to comply with European Union legislation governing the single market, the UK, 
which had joined what was then the European Economic Community in 1973, was 
eventually required to revise the definition of a ‘British’ film along more explicitly cultural 
lines. Under the Treaty of Rome (1957), and subsequent revisions to it, the EU’s 
commitment to free trade has meant that ‘any assistance given by the state which distorts 
or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of 
certain goods’ is deemed to be ‘incompatible with the common market’ (Johnson and 
Turner, p. 108). State aid ‘to promote culture and heritage conservation’ has, however, been 
held to be an exception but only where such aid does ‘not affect trading conditions and 
competition in the Community’ (European Commission 1997). In its Cinema Communication 
of 2001, the European Commission sought to clarify the implications of this ‘cultural 
derogation’ for film by laying out new rules that would permit governments to assist film 
and television production provided that they had adopted measures that did not lead to the 
distortion of economic competition and had ensured that ‘the cultural content of the works 
supported’ was established ‘on the basis of verifiable national criteria’ (European 
Commission 2001). This had a consequence for the use of tax incentives in support of film 
production by member-states insofar as they are held by the EC to be a form of ‘state aid’ 
with a capacity to distort competition and which,  therefore, have to be justified on cultural 
rather than purely economic grounds (European Commission 2006, p. 9). As Magor and 
Schlesinger point out, when the Conservative government introduced Section 42 tax relief in 
1992, they had failed to notify the Commission (which should have been called upon to 
approve it) on the grounds that they had regarded it as ‘an investor relief system’ rather 
than a form of ‘state aid’ (Magor and Schlesinger, p. 314). However, when the Labour 
government, in the face of evidence of widespread tax avoidance, decided to replace 
Section 42 and Section 48 with a new form of tax credit (whereby film production 
companies could claim a payable cash rebate of a percentage of UK qualifying film 
production expenditure) there was no question that it was obliged to demonstrate how the 
films benefiting from the new arrangements could be seen to exhibit the ‘cultural content’, 
based on ‘verifiable national criteria’, that would warrant an exemption from EU 
competition law (HMRC 2006). It was for this reason that the Treasury, when laying out the 
new tax proposals, felt it important to explain that ‘the core aim’ of film tax reliefs was ‘to 
promote the sustainable production of culturally British films, across the spectrum of 
indigenous and inward investment’ (HM Treasury 2005, p. 2). It also explains the emergence 
of a new Cultural Test that films would be required to pass in order to qualify as ‘British’. 
However, given that only British-qualifying films would then be eligible for tax relief, the 
precise character of the Cultural Test (and its definition of ‘Britishness’) were also destined 
to become a matter of political debate.  
The initial version of the Cultural Test, developed in consultation with 
representatives of the industry including the Hollywood studios, consisted of three main 
sections concerned with ‘Cultural Content’ (setting, characters, subject matter/underlying 
material, language),  ‘Cultural Hubs’ ( the use  of locations, studios and postproduction) and 
‘Cultural Practitioners’ (the nationality of those involved in making the film). In terms of 
previous definitions of a British film, the novelty of the Test was the awarding of points for 
‘content’ but this amounted to a relatively minor element. Out of 32 points available, 16 
points were required to pass the Test. However, in line with the economic imperatives 
governing the policy of tax credits, nearly half of the points available (15 out of 32) could be 
achieved under ‘Cultural Hubs’ (a set of predominantly economic criteria) whereas only 4 
points were available under ‘Cultural Content’ (DCMS 2005, p. 5).  This lack of emphasis 
upon ‘cultural content’ was noted by the European Commission when it came to review the 
‘Cultural Test’.  It questioned whether the ‘Cultural Hubs’ and ‘Cultural Practitioners’ 
sections could be regarded as referring to the ‘cultural content aspects’ of filmmaking at all 
and, given the low level of points available for ‘cultural content’, concluded that the Test 
failed to ‘ensure that the aid would be directed towards a cultural product as defined by the 
UK authorities’ (European Commission 2006, pp. 11-12).  
This decision led the UK government to submit a revised version of the Test in which 
the ‘cultural’ aspects were considerably strengthened. Under this version, the number of 
points available was reduced to 31 but the number of points for ‘Cultural Content’ was 
increased to 16. The points for Cultural Hubs were also reduced to 3 while those for Cultural 
Practitioners were reduced from 13 to 8. At the same time, a new section – ‘Cultural 
Contribution’ – was added which took into account the representation or reflection of 
British ‘culture’,’ heritage’ and ‘creativity’ which, taken together, provided a possible total of 
4 points (see Fig. 1 below).  
 
CULTURAL TEST (2007) 
A   Cultural Content 
A1 Film set in the UK   4 
A2 Lead characters British citizens or residents  4 
A3 Film based on British subject matter or underlying material  4 
A4 Original dialogue recorded mainly in English language  4 
B  Cultural Contribution 
Film represents/reflects a diverse British culture, British heritage or British creativity  4 
C  Cultural Hubs 
C1 Studio and/or location shooting/ Visual Effects/ Special Effects  2 
C2 Music Recording/Audio Post Production/Picture Post Production 1 
D  Cultural Practitioners 
D1 Director 1 D2 Scriptwriter 1 D3 Producer 1 D4 Composer 1 D5 Lead Actors 1 D6 Majority 
of Cast 1 D7 Key Staff (lead cinematographer, lead production designer, lead costume 
designer, lead editor, lead sound designer, lead visual effects supervisor, lead hair and 
makeup supervisor) 1 D8 Majority of Crew 1 (Total: 8) 
TOTAL ALL SECTIONS (pass mark 16) 31 
    Fig. 1.  
This version was approved by the European Commission but led to some criticism in the UK 
where there were not only complaints about EC interference in ‘national’ issues but also 
concerns that the added emphasis upon cultural factors might prove a disincentive to the 
kind of big-budget Hollywood films that tax incentives had been partly designed to attract. 3 
This was evident, for example, in the House of Commons when the new definition of a 
‘British film’ was discussed by the First Delegated Legislation Committee.  The Tory MP, Ed 
Vaizey, subsequently to become Minister for Culture, Communications and the Creative 
Industries at the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, complained of ‘the danger of 
altering the weighting so strongly in favour of a cultural test’ rather than sticking with ‘a 
straightforward test about where the film was made’. He then went on to warn of the 
increasingly ‘stiff competition from accession states such as the Czech Republic, Romania 
and Hungary’ which, he argued, now offered ‘tax relief for foreign films made in their 
countries in a way which Britain cannot’ (House of Commons 2006). The future Conservative 
Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (and staunch Euro-sceptic), John 
Whittingdale, also stressed the ‘economic contribution’ to ‘the British film industry’ of ‘big 
budget films which are internationally mobile’ before going on to argue that the added 
emphasis upon cultural subject-matter might mean that big Hollywood films such as Judge 
Dredd, Gladiator and Troy which had previously qualified as ‘British’, on the basis of 
economic spend, might now fail the Cultural Test (ibid.).   
In the event such fears proved to be unjustified. In his contribution to the same 
debate, the Conservative MP, Tony Baldry, suggested that the proposal might be better 
described as ‘Support the UK film industry (getting round the EU state aid provisions) order’ 
(ibid.) and there was certainly evidence to support this view. Although the new Cultural Test 
did prove slightly more difficult for some Hollywood films to pass than would previously 
have been the case, it could hardly be said to have acted as a deterrent to inward 
investment films. As an article in the US trade paper, Variety, entitled ‘Snaring the big 
Hollywood pictures’, indicated in 2010, ‘big-budget Hollywood projects’, such as John Carter, 
Captain America and X-Men, accounted for the lion’s share of ‘foreign production in the UK’ 
largely due to the attractiveness of the UK’s system of tax credits (which now had no ceiling 
and applied to all UK expenditure, including the salaries of American personnel) (Dawtrey 
2010). However, although, in this piece, such films are regarded as ‘foreign’ productions, 
they do, of course, refer to films that, in order to prove eligible for tax relief, have had to 
pass the ‘Cultural Test’ and thus qualify as ‘culturally British’ films. Establishing precisely 
how those Hollywood films, that appear to possess relatively little ‘British’ content, have 
been able to pass the Cultural Test is not, however, a straightforward matter. This is 
particularly so given that the Certification Unit (previously attached to the DCMS but 
subsequently located at the UKFC and then at the BFI) responsible for certifying films as 
‘British’ has refused to reveal how the Test is applied to individual films (on the - highly 
questionable - grounds that, despite the levels of public subsidy involved, to do so may lead 
to the disclosure of ‘commercially sensitive’ information). Inspection of the guidelines does, 
nevertheless, provide some indicators as to how the Cultural Test will have been applied.  
Points, for example, may be acquired for characters who are British even if the story 
of the film is not itself set in Britain. Non-British subject-matter may also accumulate 4 
points as long as the ‘underlying material’ (e.g. a book or story) was written by a British 
citizen or resident. The use of the English language, irrespective of the nationality of the 
setting or characters, also earns up to 4 points. And, although the Test may involve a 
‘Golden Rule’ that prevents a film from passing the test solely on the basis of points 
accumulated on the basis of Cultural Hubs, Cultural Practitioners and the use of the English 
language, there is no requirement that a film obtain any points under Cultural Contribution, 
which might be regarded as the most culturally specific part of the Test. It was, of course, 
the Cultural Contribution section that was specifically added to the Test following its 
rejection by the European Commission. However, in application, it appears to be largely 
redundant as the majority of ‘indigenous’ British films are unlikely to need the points from 
this section in order to pass the test while inward investment films would be unlikely to 
achieve points in this section without having already acquired the requisite points under 
setting, characters or subject-matter (‘Cultural Content’).  Thus, while the largest number of 
films passing the Cultural Test would generally be perceived to be in some way ‘British’, the 
Cultural Test has remained of sufficient flexibility to permit Hollywood films that might not 
immediately be recognised as British – such as the Batman films - to pass the Test and gain 
access to tax reliefs.  
However, while the European Commission may have sought to regulate the systems 
of support for film across the EU and verify the various ‘national’ criteria employed by 
different EU states, questions also began to arise as to whether these rules were, in fact, 
proving sufficiently rigorous in restricting state aid to cultural goods of a ‘European’ 
character. These issues were aired in 2009 following the EC’s decision to extend the 2001 
Cinema Communication until the end of 2012 (partly as a means of winning more time for a 
proper consultation on possible changes). In the questions and answers accompanying the 
announcement, the Commission stressed the importance of cultural conditions in 
exempting film from the rules governing state aid and indicated how these might be 
undermined by competition for inward investment. As the document explained: 
In recent years, there has been increasing global competition between countries to 
attract large (generally US or US-financed) film productions. This development…. 
could turn into a subsidy war between Member States, which would not be 
compatible with the EC competition rules. The Cinema Communication was tailored 
to European film support schemes with a primary focus on supporting national and 
European culture(s). It is therefore fundamental that national subsidies comply with 
the cultural conditions established in the Cinema Communication and do not lead to 
subsidy wars to attract foreign movies unrelated to national and European culture(s), 
as this could be highly detrimental to the entire European film sector. In fact, the 
only winners of such wars would be the US majors, and the greatest losers the 
national film industries across Europe (European Commission 2009). 
As a result of these concerns, the Commission, following a consultation on an ‘Issues paper’, 
returned to the matter in its draft Cinema Communication in 2012 in which it reflected upon 
how ‘the competition between Member States to use State aid to attract inward investment 
from major productions’ might be controlled (European Commission 2012, p. 3).  In doing 
so, it proposed to set a cap on the state aid available to big-budget productions and 
introduce a new definition of a ‘European audiovisual work’ that would potentially restrict 
the aid then available to Hollywood films shooting within the EU.  Given that these changes 
were likely to have more of an impact upon the UK than other EU states, there was strong 
resistance to them from the UK government, the BFI, the British Screen Advisory Council 
and Creative England. The idea of a ‘subsidy race’ within Europe was challenged and 
changes to the rules governing ‘inward investment productions’ were regarded as putting 
the UK’s global competitiveness in jeopardy. The argument made, in this regard, was that 
European states were not so much in competition with each other as with non-European 
territories, such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and even US states such as Louisiana, 
which would be in a position to offer more incentives than were available in Europe (BSAC 
2012). The definition of a ‘European work’ was also questioned and claimed to be in breach 
of the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ governing the adoption of state aid systems.  The 
Commission might be said to have scored something of an ‘own goal’ in this regard by 
proposing, in the context of a review of support for supposedly ‘cultural’ activity, a 
definition of a European audiovisual work that was primarily industrial in character. This 
definition was based on criteria relating to the nationality of the producer and other 
creative personnel that the EC, in its initial assessment of the UK Cultural Test, had held to 
be insufficient to identify a film as a ‘cultural product’ (European Commission 2006). As a 
result, the UK government was able to argue that it might become possible for a film to 
qualify as ‘culturally British under the UK film tax relief cultural test’ but, nonetheless, fail 
the test for a ‘European work’ (United Kingdom Government 2012).4  
Given the hostility to many of the Communication’s proposals, not just in the UK but 
elsewhere in Europe, the final version of the document marked a significant retreat from 
the positions that had previously been adopted. Even though the Communication 
maintained some anxiety about the high level of aid provided to ‘major international 
productions’, it also accepted that it might be possible for ‘aid to attract major foreign film 
projects’ to be capable of promoting culture ‘under the same conditions as aid for European 
production’ (European Commission 2013).  The proposed definition of a ‘European 
audiovisual work’ was also abandoned and, with it, the ending of the proposal to lower the 
level of aid (or ‘aid intensity’) available to works that might have been regarded as ‘non-
European’. The Communication also conceded that its ‘detailed scrutiny of cultural criteria 
in film support schemes’ had proved ‘controversial’ with Member States and indicated that, 
in future, its role would be limited to ensuring that each country had ‘an effective 
verification mechanism’ in place (ibid). Understandably, the new Cinema Communication 
was welcomed by the UK government which, now that the uncertainty over the issue of 
inward investment films had been settled, proceeded to change both the tax credit and 
Cultural Test in ways that made them yet more attractive to Hollywood productions. In the 
case of the tax credit, the rate of relief was raised from 20% to 25% of the first £20 million of 
qualifying expenditure (HM Revenue 2013). This meant that an additional £1 million of tax 
relief would be available to qualifying films (that would also continue to obtain tax relief of 
20% on expenditure over £20 million). As a way of encouraging the undertaking of visual 
effects and postproduction work in the UK, the government also lowered the minimum UK 
expenditure requirement from 25% to 10%. This was partly made possible by the Cinema 
Communication’s widening of the scope of the activities that it now covered which, in turn, 
led to changes in the Cultural Test. Under the new Test, approved in 2014, additional points 
became available for special effects and visual effects and the overall points available under 
Cultural Hubs rose to 5 (from 3). At the same time, the number of points available for the 
use of the English (or a European) language was raised to 6 (from 4). As a qualifying film 
now required 18 out of 35 points (rather than 16 out of 31), the availability of an additional 
4 points for postproduction and the use of English might be said to have further diluted the 
more specifically ‘cultural’ aspects of the Test (although a Golden Points rule did still apply).  
Assessing ‘national’ film policy 
As this account of the changing definitions, and assessment criteria, for a ‘British’ film 
indicates, the idea of a British film has proved a fluid one in which ‘cultural’ and ‘economic’  
and ‘national’ and ‘transnational’ elements have become entwined. This, in turn, may be 
understood as a product of various factors, including the complex character of international 
film financing and production, the multiple - and sometimes competing - aims of UK film 
policy and the tensions between European Union and UK political and economic objectives. 
Although, historically, British film policy may be seen to have been predominantly economic 
in character (and geared towards the support of commercial filmmaking) , the British film 
industry has also benefited from a degree of recognition that film production possesses a 
cultural – and national – significance that has made it something of a ‘special case’ that has 
distinguished it from other kinds of industrial activity (Hill 2004). While this appears to have 
become much more explicit with the introduction of a Cultural Test for British film, it would, 
as has been indicated, be difficult to interpret this in terms of a decisive break in the 
direction of ‘cultural policy’ given the way in which it has been used to pursue economic as 
well as cultural objectives. In its review of film support issues in 2011, the European 
Commission asked the question of whether the same policy and funding approaches could 
be applied to ‘attracting/redirecting major film productions’ and supporting what it refers to 
as ‘truly European (even national) “culture-intensive” content’ (European Commission 
2011). In the case of the Cultural Test, the answer has appeared to be ‘yes’ and it is the 
mixing of strategies with which it is associated that has helped to generate the relatively 
elastic conceptions of both ‘culture’ and ‘nationality’ to be found in the Test.   
In doing so, it has also demonstrated the complicated way in which national and 
transnational elements have sustained each other. While noting how the Cultural Test arose 
in response to pressure from a ‘transnational body’ in the form of the European 
Commission, Higson has nonetheless argued that the introduction of the test represents a 
‘renationalisation of British film policy’ (2011, p. 63). Higson, however, over-estimates the 
stringency of the test’s requirements and fails to identify how Hollywood films with 
ostensibly little British ‘content’ – such as The Dark Knight – might nonetheless qualify as a 
‘British’ film. In this respect, what on the face of it might appear to constitute 
‘renationalisation’ may also be understood as a form of ‘denationalisation’. Saskia Sassen, 
for example, has argued how globalisation may be understood as both a form of external 
imposition and an internal process of ‘de-nationalisation’ whereby national governments 
negotiate ‘the intersection of national law and the activities of foreign actors in its territory’ 
by issuing ‘legislative measures, executive orders, and court decisions enabling foreign firms 
to operate in their territory and their markets to become international’ (2006, p. 230). In the 
case of the film industry, this agenda of ‘denationalisation’ may take a variety of forms - 
such as the abolition of quotas and the funding of screen commissions - but may be seen to 
apply to tax policy as well. In some respects, the employment of tax incentives has entailed 
a degree of external imposition in the way in which ‘national’ film policy has been required 
to adjust to global competition for inward investment and to respond to the demands of 
mobile Hollywood productions, and the corporations responsible for them, for state 
support. On the other hand, this development has also relied upon internal processes of ‘de-
nationalisation’ whereby the government has established the means by which ‘state aid’ 
may be provided to international productions on the basis of a Cultural Test, and a 
definition of the ‘national’, that, in application, demands very little by way of national-
cultural specificity.   
As such, the policy has both economic and cultural implications. Although tax 
incentives do not constitute the only instrument of film policy, they do account for 
substantial sums of money. Indeed, according to BFI figures, tax relief accounted for 57% of 
public funding for film in 2012-13 whereas grant-in-aid provided by the Department of 
Culture, Media and Sport amounted to only 8% (BFI 2014a, p.204).  And while the majority 
of films to benefit from tax relief may have been ‘independent’ productions, the largest pay-
outs, as would be anticipated, have gone to big-budget Hollywood productions. According 
to HM Revenue and Customs, the tax-credit payments for the period from 2007-8 to 2013-
14 made to large-budget films (i.e. those with a budget over £20 million) amounted to £890 
million, representing 67% of all payments but only 11% of claims (HMRC 2014). The use of 
tax credits to support Hollywood productions, however, has generally commanded a degree 
of political consensus and even an element of national pride. This was evident, for example, 
in the way in which the Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, 
associated himself with the production of Star Wars: The Force Awakens, a film that was not 
only classified as ‘culturally British’ but also awarded one the largest individual pay-outs 
under the tax-credit scheme (reportedly over £31 million) (Spence 2016).5 Revelations of 
this kind have led to some questioning of the propriety of providing taxpayer subsidies of 
this magnitude to wealthy Hollywood studios. 6 This, in turn, may be seen to be linked to a 
more general public debate concerning the declining proportion of tax being paid by large 
transnational corporations (compared to individual citizens) and the levels of ‘corporate 
welfare’ provided to them at a time of government-imposed austerity and cuts in state 
benefits (Hutton 2014, Farnsworth 2015). While such debates have tended to be motivated by 
concerns for fairness and social justice, there have also been arguments from traditional 
conservatives that such subsidies appear to be at odds with the non-interventionist, ‘free market’ 
policies that governments otherwise claim to be pursuing. It was certainly in this spirit that 
Conservative MP, Steve Baker, asked his own government minister, in the debate in the House of 
Commons on the Draft Films (Definition of ‘British Film’) Order 2015, whether he was arguing ‘that it 
is necessary for us to bribe these companies with taxpayers’ money in order for them to stay in our 
country, rather than go somewhere else to accept bribes from other governments’ (House of 
Commons 2015). However, despite expressions of concern such as these, tax reliefs have 
generally been perceived to be of net benefit to the national economy and were, indeed, 
extended by the Conservative government in 2014 to include high-end television, animation 
and video games in addition to film (Oxford Economics 2012, Olsberg SPI and Nordicity 
2015).  
However, although tax incentives for film production may be regarded as a strategy 
for achieving ‘competitiveness’ in the short-run, it has also led the UK government to 
engage in the very ‘subsidy war’ that the EU warned against. As Dicken explains, the 
pressure upon states to compete for ‘a bigger slice of the global economic pie’ has 
encouraged an ‘intense involvement in…. “locational tournaments”… to entice investment 
projects into their own national territories’ as well as ‘an enormous escalation in the extent of 
competitive bidding….. to attract the relatively limited amount of geographically mobile investment’ 
(Dicken 2015, p.183).  The implications of this for tax policy in support of film are explained by 
Morawetz who indicates how countries such as the UK and Canada are ‘forced to maintain 
and increase tax incentives’ not only in order ‘to stay competitive’ but also to avoid losing 
existing levels of investment and production to new competitors (2008, p.142).  This is a 
diagnosis that would appear to be confirmed by the Conservative government’s decision to 
make increasingly generous tax reliefs available to both film and other creative industries.  
However, while such a strategy conforms to the aspiration to make the UK a ‘creative hub’ 
providing services to the global film industry, it has, as David Steele (2015) suggests, much 
less to offer the UK independent sector which, even with the benefit of tax relief, continues 
to occupy a structurally disadvantaged position within the international film industry - 
particularly in terms of access to distribution – and which, therefore, struggles to achieve 
long-term economic viability. The relative fragility of the independent sector also has 
consequences for the diversity and range of British filmmaking and the ways in which 
‘nationality’ is addressed. For although the Cultural Test may allocate points for the 
‘significant representation’ of ‘British cultural heritage’ and ‘British cultural diversity’, these 
are not, as has been seen, necessary to pass the test and do not demand much by way of 
complexity or even specificity in what comes to be classified as ‘culturally British’ films (BFI 
2014b). As a result, the films that benefit the most from the system of tax reliefs are those 
which, due to their relationship with the Hollywood studios, commonly offer the most 
conventional signifiers of ‘cultural Britishness’ rather than those that are engaged in 
challenging and refashioning them.  
Conclusion 
This article has looked at different stages of film policy in the UK concerned with support for 
the production of ‘British’ films. In some respects, these appear to represent fairly distinct 
phases. Initially, UK government film policy was regarded as protectionist in character, 
defending a national film industry through the adoption of quotas for British films. In the 
post-war period, film policy assumed a more social-democratic interventionist form through 
the provision of public subsidies and loans (such as the Eady levy). With the ascent of 
economic neo-liberalism and globalising market forces, film policy, from the 1990s onwards, 
placed an increasing emphasis upon the provision of ‘market-friendly’ incentives (such as 
tax reliefs) designed to attract investment in an industry increasingly oriented towards 
‘global’ production. Viewed in this way, film policy objectives may be seen to have 
undergone a shift away from the protection, or support, of British cinema in the face of 
overwhelming Hollywood dominance towards a strategy of making the UK as welcoming a 
destination as possible for ‘offshore’ or ‘local’ Hollywood production. However, by focusing 
on the changing legal definitions of a ‘British’ film, and the ways in which they have been 
implemented, this article also suggests how, from the 1920s onwards, there has been a 
degree of acceptance of the British film industry’s dependence upon Hollywood 
involvement and thus a degree of ambiguity in the way in which a ‘British’ film has been 
defined (and how ‘national’ film policies have been pursued).  
This ambiguity has, however, become most evident since the introduction of a 
‘Cultural Test’ for ‘British’ film. Although this may seem to mark a significant break with 
earlier industrial conceptions of a British film by introducing more specifically cultural 
criteria, it has, in its application, been relatively easy to pass and has proved to be highly 
‘Hollywood-friendly’. In this regard, the Cultural Test may be seen to have rested upon a 
degree of blurring of the apparent boundaries between the ‘economic’ and the ‘cultural’ as 
well as the ‘national’ and the ‘transnational’. In highlighting some of these issues, the article 
also indicates how ‘national’ discourses and practices have continued to inform and 
structure the economic and cultural dynamics of contemporary ‘British’ cinema as well as  
engaging with, rather than necessarily standing in opposition to, ‘transnational’ and 
globalising trends.  
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1 The issue of nationality and, indeed, nationalities within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland is, of course, a highly complex one that cannot be adequately addressed in this 
particular context. However, although there are specific dimensions to film policy in England, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the same legal definition of a ‘British’ film has applied across 
all parts of the UK.  
2 As Harry Goulbourne points out, British ‘nationality’ did not, strictly speaking, exist prior to the 
British Nationality Act of 1948 insofar as inhabitants of Britain and the British Empire were up until 
then conceived to be ‘subjects’ of the Crown (1991, pp.90-91).  
3 In this respect, such debates reflected a broader political division, most evident within the 
Conservative party, between a commitment to a deregulated ‘free’ European market and a disdain 
for European legislation that has been perceived to undermine national sovereignty. The 
continuation of this fault-line in British politics has since led, in June 2016, to a Referendum on the 
UK’s membership of the European Union that has pitted members of the Conservative Party against 
each other and resulted in a vote narrowly in favour of UK withdrawal.     
4 It is worth noting in this context that the Cultural Test had, in fact, abandoned the reference to the 
role of British companies in the production of British films that had been a feature of films legislation 
since the 1920s. It will be recalled that it was the vagueness about the definition of a ‘British’ 
company that had been regarded as something of a Trojan Horse for Hollywood interests in the run-
up to the Cinematograph Films Act of 1927 and, clearly, the omission of any reference to British 
production companies in the Cultural Test has also made it easier for Hollywood productions to pass 
it. This lack of emphasis upon the ownership and control of companies may, of course, be related to 
more general patterns of foreign direct investment and ownership in the UK encouraged by the 
‘liberalisation’ of the UK economy which has, in turn, generated considerable public debate 
regarding its economic and political consequences (see, for example, Brummer 2013; Meek 2014; 
Hutton 2015).  
5 As the figures for individual films are not made publicly available by HMRC, journalists have 
generally drawn on company accounts for information. In 2014, Christian Sylt reported that Disney 
had received nearly £170 million from the UK taxman since 2007 (Sylt 2014). In an earlier article, he 
also indicated that this included payments of £10.8m for Thor 2 and £5.3m for Guardians of the 
Galaxy (Sylt, 2013). 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
6 Miller and Maxwell (2011) identify how Hollywood corporations have benefited from a variety of 
forms of ‘state subvention’. The power of transnational corporations more generally to take 
advantage of competition amongst states for inward investment is discussed by O’Brien and 
Williams (2007, chap. 6). 
